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31 
The Move to the Middle: The Enduring Threat of 
“Harmful” Speech to the End-to-End Principle 
John G. Palfrey, Jr. 
Robert Rogoyski* 
This Article traces the evolution of thinking regarding the 
technical concept of the end-to-end principle and the legal concept of 
the regulation of the flow of packets across the Internet. We focus on 
the manner in which the state, in concert with private parties, has 
approached the tension between restricting the flow of certain packets 
and vindicating their citizens’ interests, both legal and otherwise, in 
free expression. We argue that the primary mode of legal regulation 
of the Internet has shifted from a focus on outlawing activities at the 
nodes—end-points in the network—to a growing emphasis on 
regulating closer to the middle of the network. This trend is, on its 
face, good for the law enforcement officer, but worrisome to the 
technologist and the democratic activist; the end-to-end principle, 
held dear by those who built the Internet for decades, is under threat. 
In the process, this shift also places corporations, often based in other 
jurisdictions, in the position of enforcing the rules of the regime in 
which they are doing business, but whose views on free expression 
and other civil liberties the corporations’ officers and directors do not 
necessarily share. We argue that the end-to-end principle, once 
translated loosely into political speak as “net neutrality,” is a forceful 
rhetorical concept—and, if done right, sound public policy—but that 
it no longer describes the Internet on the ground, if it ever did.   
 
 * John Palfrey is a Clinical Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and the Executive 
Director of the Berkman Center for Internet & Society. Rob Rogoyski is a graduate of the 
Harvard Law School. The authors wish to thank Jonathan Zittrain and each of the participants 
in the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy’s Symposium on the Rehnquist Court 
and the First Amendment, held in November of 2005, for their commentary on the presentation 
that led to this paper. The authors alone are responsible for all errors and omissions.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is common for technologists to support the policy that 
intermediaries on the Internet should “pass all packets.” This so-
called end-to-end principle of network neutrality calls for intelligence 
to be located at the edges of the network if at all possible. While the 
end-to-end principle has been both challenged and refined since 
Saltzer, Reed, and Clark first documented it in the early 1980s, it 
remains a sacred concept among true believers in the openness of the 
Internet's original design.1 Over the past decade, most nations—the 
United States among them—have established rules that sometimes 
encourage and sometimes require intermediaries to block or inspect 
packets as they travel across the Internet.2 These rules prompt private 
actors to violate the end-to-end principle, at least theoretically, in the 
name of public interest. This Article considers the changes over the 
past ten years in states’ approaches to the rules requiring private 
parties to control packets at various points in the network, a trend 
brought into relief by the current public debate over competing “net 
neutrality” proposals—a political and economic concept often 
conflated with the end-to-end principle of network design.  
We suggest that a trajectory is emerging, whereby fewer controls 
are imposed at the end-points, and more are imposed closer to the 
center of the network. (We note also an increasing trend toward states 
requiring or otherwise causing private parties to exercise control of 
packets as they pass through the network.) This trend is clearest in 
those nations that are seeking to impose content-based filters on 
Internet content, though we make the case that a similar trend is 
apparent in the United States as well. 
In terms of situating these ideas within the cyberlaw literature, this 
Article strives to build the short conceptual bridge between previous 
Internet law and policy scholarship concerning the states’ and 
intermediaries’ role in the control of online intermediaries and an 
emerging trend, based in part on new emerging issues, in favor of 
 
 1. J.H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in Systems Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS 
IN COMPUTER SYS. 277 (1984), available at http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/ 
endtoend/endtoend.pdf. 
 2. See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET: ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD 65–86 (2006). 
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forcing intermediaries to carry out the interests of the state at the 
middle of the network. We self-consciously pick up on and seek to 
extend the work of scholars such as Jonathan Zittrain,3 Lawrence 
Lessig,4 Timothy Wu,5 Jack Goldsmith,6 and Joel Reidenberg,7 
among others.8 The idea is to focus on a key question of Internet law 
in the context of what is now commonly known as “Web 2.0”: What 
actions are states taking when they do not want certain types of 
packets to pass through today’s network, or when they seek to learn 
more about the packets and who are sending and receiving them?9  
The short history of states seeking to block the passage of packets 
includes five primary regulatory approaches that fall into two broad 
clusters. The initial, broad cluster involves state-mandated controls at 
the end-points of the network. First, states have sought to block 
harmful packets at their source.10 The idea is to stem the problem by 
making it illegal to send packets deemed to be harmful to some 
segment of the public.11 This idea is based primarily on the notion 
that access to the information embedded in such packets is harmful to 
the public interest. Examples of this approach include the 
 
 3. See Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653 (2003). 
 4. See Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996). 
 5. See Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679 (2003). 
 6. See GOLDSMITH & WU,  supra note 2; Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998); Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of 
Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475 (1998); Jack Goldsmith & 
Timothy Wu, Digital Borders, LEGAL AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2006, available at http://www.legal 
affairs.org/issues/January-February-2006/feature_ goldsmith_janfeb06.msp. 
 7. See Joel R. Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 
213 (2003–04). 
 8. See Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The 
Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6 (2003); Michael 
Geist, Cyberlaw 2.0, 44 B.C. L. REV. 323 (2003); Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? 
Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345 (2001); 
Justin Hughes, The Internet and the Persistence of Law, 44 B.C. L. REV. 359 (2003); David R. 
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1367 (1996); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from 
Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395 (2000); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in 
Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
 9. The term “Web 2.0” was coined by eminent technologist and writer Tim O’Reilly. See 
Tim O’Reilly, What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation 
of Software, O’REILLY, Sept. 30, 2005, http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/oreilly/tim/news/2005/ 
09/30/what-is-web-20.html. 
 10. See Zittrain, supra note 3, at 659. 
 11. See id. 
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Communications Decency Act of 1996,12 which sought 
(unsuccessfully) to stop the transmission of pornography to minors, 
and the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003,13 which (at least somewhat 
successfully) disallows the sending of unsolicited commercial e-mails 
if certain rules are not followed. 
Second, states have banned the possession, or receipt, of the 
information enclosed in data packets, such as child pornography or 
copyrighted works.14 Third, some regulations mandate that certain 
packets be accompanied by specific information in order to be sent or 
received. CAN-SPAM is again an example of this type of regulation. 
CAN-SPAM requires that certain header information is included in 
some messages.15 Also, the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act 
of 1998 (COPPA)16 requires that web sites verify that users are over 
thirteen years of age before providing most online services. None of 
these first three approaches necessarily represent a substantial 
departure from the end-to-end principle, so long as no intermediaries, 
such as Internet service providers (ISPs), are required to take any 
action on behalf of the state to enforce the rules. 
The second cluster involves state-mandated controls at the middle 
of the network. These other two primary strategies, described below, 
represent a greater impingement on the end-to-end principle. Each is 
more sophisticated from a regulatory perspective and, many argue, 
more likely in the near-term to be effective at achieving its stated 
goals. In the first strategy of this type, states prompt private parties to 
block or listen in on packets as they pass.17 Ordinarily, an ISP—
whether serving the source or the destination of the packet—bears 
this burden, almost always without direct compensation.18 Examples 
of such “unfunded mandates” are the takedown provisions in section 
 
 12. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000). 
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2000); see also Derek E. Bambauer, Solving the Inbox Paradox: An 
Information-Based Policy Approach to Unsolicited E-mail Advertising, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5 
(2005). 
 14. See Zittrain, supra note 3, at 659, 671–72. 
 15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7704–05 (2000). 
 16. Id. §§ 6501–06.  
 17. See Zittrain, supra note 3, at 664–76. 
 18. There is no provision in U.S. federal law to compensate ISPs for most of the basic 
monitoring tasks required of them, such as responding to routine police requests for information 
regarding subscribers. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/4
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512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, under which the United 
States federal government requires ISPs and other service providers 
to filter packets as they flow through the network.19   
In the second strategy, the state itself plays a direct role in filtering 
and reviewing packets as they pass.20 For example, libraries play such 
a role to protect minors from potentially harmful online content, as 
required by the Children’s Internet Protection Act of 2000 (CIPA).21 
While rare as an approach, some countries, such as Saudi Arabia and 
Burma, place an apparatus of government at or near a single point of 
control on the network and exercise the state’s will at that aperture, as 
research by the OpenNet Initiative has demonstrated.22 
This Article concludes that regulatory approaches of this second 
sort—whereby the state either requires an intermediary to filter 
packets or the state itself takes on the job of filtering—are likely to 
continue to be prominent, as approaches of the first sort fail to get the 
job done effectively when it comes to the thorniest of online 
problems.23 Courts are unlikely to stand in the way of such a trend. 
The state action involved in the first cluster of regulations is no less 
clear than in the second. Further, the negative impact on the 
technologists’ network design is not a factor in the analysis. The 
regulations of the second cluster are more likely, absent changes in 
social norms and enforcement practices, to achieve the goals driving 
the state action. In other countries, such as China, where 
constitutional protection of free expression is less strong, or at least 
less consistently upheld, the relative effectiveness of regulations 
placing control closer to the center of the network will likely lead to 
 
 19. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). 
 20. This case is made broadly through the work of the OpenNet Initiative, a collaborative 
initiative that joins researchers from the University of Cambridge, the University of Toronto, 
and the Harvard Law School, which has documented Internet filtering worldwide. The principal 
investigators are Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain.  For 
the results of the research, see OpenNet Initiative, http://www.opennet.net/ (last visited Aug. 
16, 2006). 
 21. See Zittrain, supra note 3, at 670; see also 114 Stat. 2763A-335. 
 22. See OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN SAUDI ARABIA IN 2004 (2004), 
http://www.opennetinitiative.net/saudi/; OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN BURMA 
IN 2005 (2005), http://www.opennetinitiative.net/burma/. 
 23. Joel Reidenberg came to a similar conclusion. “The essay maintains that states will 
increasingly try to use network intermediaries such as payment systems and Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) as enforcement instruments.” Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 216. 
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more approaches of this kind, especially as the importance of the 
Internet continues to grow and problems take on higher potential 
consequences. Absent a strong argument to the contrary, or effective 
action by a legislature to give “net neutrality,” a cousin of the end-to-
end principle, the force of law, this trend toward control of the middle 
of the network—tying private actors into the web of those who must 
exercise control—is likely to continue. 
From the vantage point of some participants, there is reason to 
consider such a trend to be a positive one. As a matter of international 
governance, approaches that involve asserting authority over fewer 
points of control—as when control is stationed only at the 
intermediaries through which packets must flow—rather than at 
billions of end-points are more likely to enable efficiency and 
international coordination of enforcement. The primary benefit of 
such a trend is that, barring approaches that would require a 
wholesale change in user behavior, those who seek to enforce the 
laws related to Internet matters are more likely to be effective 
through the assertion of control at intermediate points in the 
network.24 The fear that the Internet can devolve into a haven for 
lawless behavior if left untended—for instance, a thriving market in 
money-laundering, illicit gambling, and child pornography—might 
be allayed.25 
However, there are several substantial costs likely to stem from 
such a trend. First, the end-to-end principle—both as a matter of 
effective network design and of ancillary benefits it has introduced—
has served global society well and should not lightly be discarded as 
a strong preference.26 The end-to-end principle per se has no legal 
 
 24. See Zittrain, supra note 3, at 669, 673, 682–84. 
 25. See R.S. Rosenberg, Controlling Access to the Internet: The Role of Filtering, in 
ETHICS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 35 (2001). In some contexts, there is a strong 
argument to be made that the Internet community can govern itself effectively through the peer-
production of Internet governance. See, e.g., David R. Johnson et al., The Accountable Internet: 
Peer Production of Internet Governance, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 9 (2004). 
 26. A parallel argument is made in an amicus curiae brief filed by Professor William W. 
Fisher III et al. with the Supreme Court in the case of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd. See Brief of Amici Curiae Internet Law Faculty in Support of Respondents, 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480), 
2005 WL 508098 (arguing that the so-called Sony-Betamax standard, which shields the makers 
of dual-use technologies from copyright infringement lawsuits, should be preserved despite the 
fact that some third-parties use these technologies to break the law).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/4
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force, and therefore is unlikely to be defensible, other than 
rhetorically or insofar as it aligns with other rights, such as speech 
and privacy, upon judicial review.  
Second, the switch toward intermediaries inquiring into passing 
packets may encourage them to make further efforts to control what 
travels through the network, beyond that which the state mandates, to 
ensure compliance with the state’s rules.27 The costs of such 
interference include higher transaction costs, borne initially by the 
ISPs but likely passed on to consumers or partners in the value chain, 
and further potential encroachment on civil liberties—carried out by 
private actors at the behest of states or by states directly. In the hands 
of private actors, initially prodded by states but later no longer 
meeting the state action threshold, fewer safeguards exist to protect 
the speech rights of citizens.  
Finally, the change may affect the current character of the 
Internet—a global, unitary conglomeration of networks—leading to a 
balkanized series of smaller networks ringed by national, regional, or 
other geographic borders. While some might cheer such an outcome, 
the possibilities of cross-cultural understanding, reconnection of 
diasporan populations, gains in international commerce, and the 
“generativity” that Jonathan Zittrain celebrates may be less fully 
realized over time as a result.28  
II. A HANDFUL OF PROBLEMS IN CYBERSPACE 
The rapid rise in popularity of the Internet has spawned a series of 
problems that are different in kind from problems that existed 
beforehand. Four cases of “harmful” online speech frame the general 
problem giving rise to this inquiry. The general problem is the 
tension between the desirability of the end-to-end principle and the 
desire to regulate certain behavior online. These problems, with fact 
patterns that bleed across each other’s borders, cover a series of 
 
 27. See Zittrain, supra note 3, at 685–87. 
 28. Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Intent, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1980–93 (2006) 
(arguing that “Generativity denotes a technology’s overall capacity to produce unprompted 
change driven by large, varied, and uncoordinated audiences” and contending that generative 
computers and a generative network, the focus of this Article, are desirable but can also lead to 
unanticipated problems). 
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topics—sex, commerce, culture, and politics—and span the short 
history of the Internet. Consider the following four scenarios: the 
child pornographer peddling his wares over the Internet, the spammer 
paid by a stock-trading firm to peddle a penny stock hoping to pump-
and-dump it to millions of prospective investors, the young remix 
artist with a hard-drive full of copyrighted music files, and the human 
rights activist using the Internet to organize on an unpopular topic in 
a repressive regime, such as in Burma or China.29 
A. Sex 
The original problems in the mid-1990s that gave rise to control 
over the Internet mostly dealt with offensive images, such as 
pornography, or text, such as hate speech.30 Child pornographers 
found the Internet to be an easy way to share images, and also found 
it easier to hide online than in real space.31 A pornographer who had 
made his early fortune in the hard-copy (and hard-core) magazine 
 
 29. With respect to the interactions between human users and internet architecture, we 
adopt a participation-centered approach, rather than a technology-centered one. Our inquiry is 
focused on the human component of speech on the web. For these purposes, the essence of the 
net is a set of nodes and conduits. Conceptualized this way, a node in the network can be: an 
end user who sends information directly to another user (e.g., a user who sends an email), a user 
who posts information online with the intention that the information be accessible to other users 
(e.g., a website operator), a recipient of a directed communication (e.g., an email recipient), or a 
user who surfs accessible websites. By conduit, we mean the points along the route that the 
information travels, which are regulated by any intermediary other than the party responsible 
for posting or sending the content, or the intended recipient. This node/conduit conception of 
the network paints the Internet in the broadest of brush strokes, and is misleading in its 
simplicity. All the same, this conceptualization is useful for two reasons. First, a participation-
centered approach situates the analysis in terms of practical burdens on free expression. The 
Internet itself is not speech, and computer terminals at the end points of the network are not 
speakers. The Internet is a conduit for speech, a medium. It is true that electronic transmissions 
will undertake an intricate series of hops as they maneuver through and along the various layers 
of the net. Yet, what matters is whether a human speaker could speak, and whether a willing 
listener could hear that voice. A participation-centered approach puts the focus where it should 
be for First Amendment purposes: whether, as a practical matter, speech actually travels from 
end-to-end—that is, from speaker to recipient. Second, this broad categorization is useful 
because it highlights a problematic trend: over the last decade, attempts to control the network 
have moved from the nodes to third-party intermediaries in the middle of the network. 
 30. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 31. Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzalez  at the National Center 
for Missing and Exploited Children, Apr. 20, 2006, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/ 
speeches/2006/ag_speech_060420.html. 
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business would quickly find that the Internet offered much fatter 
margins.32 The images he posted online, some accessible for free and 
some for a fee, could be accessed by minors anywhere that the 
network reached, whether in the heartland of America or in a Muslim 
state in the Middle East. Likewise, a troubled undergraduate found a 
home on the Internet, and an all-too-ready audience, for his lurid 
musings about what he would like to do to a young woman in his 
class.33 
These problems persist online today, only now they are better 
understood, more widespread, and more complex than they were 
during the earlier iterations of the Internet. This is due to changes in 
scale and social norms. Solutions adopted to address problems such 
as these vary widely across the world. However, most attempts to 
regulate sexually-charged speech of this sort have sought to regulate 
the end-points of the network—either by punishing the sender or the 
receiver of the data after the transmission has occurred.34 
B. Commerce 
The Internet, initially used for government and academic 
purposes, quickly became a powerful commercial medium. Its 
promise of serving as a series of low-friction marketplaces became 
obvious by the end of the 1990s. The network itself has become a 
“trade route” of unprecedented proportions, complete with 
checkpoints.35 Rather than picking up the phone to do business, 
commercial actors began to rely on e-mail—the first “killer app”—as 
a preferred means of reaching customers, suppliers, and business 
partners.36 Legitimate commercial e-mail generated high returns on 
 
 32. It is widely known that online publication is less costly to produce than traditional 
publications because the cost of printing and physical distribution is eliminated in the online 
context and most text and images are now initially created in digital format. 
 33. The most famous case of this sort is the Jake Baker matter. See Electronic Frontier 
Foundation’s “Legal Cases-Jake Baker, the U. of Michigan, & the FBI” Archive, 
http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/Baker_UMich_ case/ (last visited May 16, 2006) (chronicling the 
matter). 
 34. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 35. ROLAND L. TROPE & GREGORY E. UPCHURCH, CHECKPOINTS IN CYBERSPACE: BEST 
PRACTICES TO AVERT LIABILITY IN CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS (2005). 
 36. JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES 
OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 7 (2005) (noting the ubiquity of e-mail, even 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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investment for marketers, in many cases at far lower costs than mail 
or telemarketing.37 But for these purposes, consider the direct-
marketing company that helps stock speculators tout penny stocks for 
little-known drug treatment companies. For a fee, these companies 
infect “zombie” computers and hijack them to send out millions of 
messages.38 The unwanted messages, delivered to in-boxes around 
the world, promise that the penny stock will “soar” in the next few 
days.39 The stock does in fact rise after the e-mail is sent, but only to 
plummet a few days later to a level below where it started, leaving 
only a few people, including the spammer, better off. However, many 
others are left holding the bag (in this case, filled with devalued 
stock).40 A related set of problems, the security threats to the network 
often borne by spam and other means of dissemination, increase the 
potential damage of these activities.41 
C. Culture 
The most dramatic dispute regarding the Internet, at least in the 
United States, has been the culture war between the publishers of 
copyrighted materials and those who wish to copy, modify, or 
redistribute them, often without permission from or compensation to 
the creator.42 This dispute over the control of digital media, most 
colorfully displayed by the public debates and lawsuits over peer-to-
 
ahead of search, as the most popular Internet application). 
 37. For the same reasons that online publication is cheaper than distributing printed 
publications, e-mail marketing saves printing and mailing costs to marketers who relied in the 
past on direct mail as a means of reaching customers. Telemarketing involves the expense of 
paid staff to call prospective customers, while e-mail requires far less in terms of human 
involvement, even when tailored to individual names and preferences. 
 38. The London Action Plan, a joint effort by anti-spam enforcement authorities, 
describes in detail efforts to decrease the threat of zombie bots. See The London Action Plan on 
International Spam Enforcement Cooperation, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/10/041012london 
actionplan.pdf (last visited May 16, 2006). 
 39. See Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Stock Spams and Scams, http://www.nasd.com/ 
web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_006041 (last visited Aug. 16, 
2006). 
 40. Id.  
 41. Zittrain, supra note 28 (establishing the threat of a technological disaster on a massive 
scale and its impact on policy-making). 
 42. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004). 
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peer file sharing of recorded movies and music, has resulted in calls 
for further regulation of Internet activities.43 Just as the music 
recording and motion picture industries have sought to control the 
distribution and use of digital media through legal, technical, and 
market-oriented means, a community has developed supporting the 
notion that this revolution in digital media affords new opportunities 
for creativity, the furtherance of cross-cultural understanding, and 
new modes of money-making.44 
A “free culture” movement has arisen, both on the Internet and in 
real-space, that seeks, in the words of Professor Lawrence Lessig, “a 
balance between anarchy and control” of digital content.45 The key 
player in this movement is the young, expressive digital re-mix artist 
with a hard-drive, and probably a few iPods, full of digital sound 
recordings—some of which he has paid for, and some of which he 
has not. The fight over how he obtained those recordings and what he 
can, or ought to be able to, do with them—particularly online—
continues unabated. Most relevant for this inquiry, the holders of 
copyrighted materials have asked for more extensive regulation as to 
how the re-mix artist and hundreds of millions of others may pass 
these packets over the network.46 The parties best positioned to help 
the copyright holders, and in some cases the law enforcement 
officers, have been those who provide Internet access services to the 
would-be file-sharers. 
D. Politics 
Somewhat later in this short history, roughly in 2000 with the 
meteoric rise and fall of John McCain’s presidential bid, the Internet 
became a powerful tool for those seeking to affect political change. 
 
 43. One of the many sources of information on this cultural debate is the weblog of Derek 
Slater. A Copyfighter’s Musings, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/cmusings/. 
 44. WILLIAM W. FISHER ET AL., CONTENT AND CONTROL: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF 
POLICY CHOICES ON POTENTIAL ONLINE BUSINESSES IN THE MUSIC AND FILM INDUSTRIES 
(2005), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/files/content_control.pdf. 
 45. LESSIG,  supra note 42, at xvi.  
 46. The examples of this phenomenon over the past decade are many. A specific recent 
example is the INDUCE Act, a proposal to make it unlawful to induce others to violate 
copyright. Although Congress did not pass such a law, the Supreme Court, in MGM v. 
Grokster, 125 U.S. 686 (2005), effectively established such a standard through its ruling. 
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The most compelling cases for protecting the free flow of information 
online are derived from these sets of problems. 
Consider the situation of a human rights activist operating in an 
Asian country known, among other things, for its mistrust of labor 
organizers. The activist seeks to share information about a campaign 
to improve the lives of low-wage hotel workers. The activist, after 
consulting with a college roommate who works in Silicon Valley, 
sets up a free weblog—an online, personal journal accessible to 
anyone located anywhere in the world.47 The weblog is hosted by a 
prominent American technology company with a subsidiary based in 
this Asian country. For a few weeks, the activist posts stories about 
the poor treatment of hotel workers, takes and publishes photographs 
of striking workers, and offers free, globally accessible syndicated 
feeds of her writing and pictures. Her blog quickly becomes the hub 
of an online debate about the hotel industry. A month into her blog 
experiment, the service provider informs the activist by e-mail that 
her blog has been taken off the Internet and may not be restarted, her 
RSS (“Really Simple Syndication”) feed silenced. When pressed, the 
blog-hosting company admits that a state official made plain to the 
company that the blog was to be taken off the Internet because it was 
a threat to state security.48 
In each instance, the runaway success of the Internet as a cheap, 
effective international communication and distribution network has 
led to difficult problems. These problems give rise to state-driven 
solutions that, in turn, threaten network neutrality. Most of these 
threats to network neutrality bring with them threats—sometimes 
justified—to speech and privacy interests online. 
III. MODES OF CONTROL 
Despite the challenges of regulating the decentralized and global 
Internet, many countries have sought to exert control over the flow of 
packets on the network as soon as problems that seemed to implicate 
 
 47. See Dave Winer, What Makes a Weblog a Weblog, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ 
whatMakesAWeblogAWeblog (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).  
 48. There are a number of stories that roughly fit this fact pattern. One example involved 
the Microsoft Corporation’s MSN Spaces product. See, e.g., David Barboza & Tom Zeller, Jr., 
Microsoft Shuts Blog’s Site After Complaints by Beijing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2006, at C3. 
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public policy arose.49 These regulatory efforts have taken five broad 
forms, falling into two large clusters. These five regulatory schemes 
are not crisply delineated, nor are they mutually exclusive in terms of 
their application to a certain public policy issue. The organization of 
this typology is meant to demonstrate a trend toward control at mid-
points in the network. However, it is not meant to demonstrate that 
other modes of regulation are unusable or likely to be unused 
hereafter. The key point emerging from this typology is the general 
trend away from modes of regulation that are consonant with the end-
to-end principle, towards modes of regulation that are not. 
A. The First Wave of State Regulation: Control at the Nodes 
It is worth noting, before getting into what has and has not been 
done with respect to regulating the Internet, that there are many 
modes of regulating the flow of packets online. Most famously, 
Lawrence Lessig argued that there are four primary modes of 
regulation: law, code, markets, and norms.50 This theory has 
withstood a (short) test of time. Alternative institutions that achieve 
regulatory, or at least political force, also continue to emerge, as 
Yochai Benkler argued in multiple contexts.51 This Article suggests 
that online regulation can take many forms as a starting point, but 
focuses on the specific approaches that countries have taken—the 
“law” mode—in regulating the flow of packets.  
The first cluster of state-based regulatory approaches relies on 
controls at the end-points of the network. State entities have 
attempted to ban the transmission of certain types of information 
deemed as a matter of public policy to be harmful, to ban possession 
or intentional receipt of such information, and to mandate that some 
packets be accompanied by specific information in order to be sent or 
received. None of these three approaches represents a substantial 
departure from the end-to-end principle, so long as no intermediaries, 
such as the ISPs, are required to take action on behalf of the state to 
 
 49. This Article chronicles most of these efforts, of which the Communications Decency 
Act of 1996 is a prime early example. 
 50. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). 
 51. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006). 
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enforce the rules. When viewed chronologically, it is clear that they 
also represent the first wave of efforts to control the Internet. 
Although some of the court battles over these approaches have only 
recently ended, their legislative impetus was primarily a phenomenon 
of the mid- to late-1990s.52 
1. Ban the Transmission of Packets at Their Source 
The most common regulatory approach has been to ban the 
transmission of packets at their source—that is, to make it unlawful 
to send, or attempt to send, certain packets via the Internet.53 The idea 
is to render illegal the act of sending packets that carry information 
deemed harmful to some segment of the public, primarily on the 
grounds that open access to the information embedded therein is 
harmful to the public interest. 
The most notable of these efforts are the attempts to control access 
to sexually explicit materials. The year 1996 was a watershed for 
regulations of this sort. The Communications Decency Act (CDA),54 
part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, included several such 
restrictions.55 The CDA amended federal obscenity laws to ban the 
transmission of obscene materials using an “interactive computer 
service.”56 The CDA also amended the telecommunications laws to 
ban the transmission of “indecent” messages to minors.57 Later that 
year, Congress made another major effort to control source 
transmissions with the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA),58 
which banned the transmission of virtual child pornography.  
The CDA provisions banning certain transmissions to minors and 
the CPPA were challenged on constitutional grounds shortly after 
 
 52. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 53. A variant of banning transmission of packets on the Internet is the regulation of 
broadcast transmissions in the traditional telecommunications context. See, e.g., Derek 
Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the Fallacy of the 
Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (discussing the regulation and 
the relationship of the state and intermediaries in this parallel context). 
 54. The CDA is codified in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000). 
 55. Id. § 223(a), (d). 
 56. Id. § 223(d)(1)(A)–(B). 
 57. Id. § 223(b)(2)(A). 
 58. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2000). 
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their passage.59 The Supreme Court found both to be overbroad under 
the First Amendment—the CDA provisions in 1997,60 and the CPPA 
in 2002.61 After the Court overturned these provisions of the CDA, 
Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) in 1998.62 
Although COPA’s provisions were narrower than the CDA 
provisions they replaced, banning instead the commercial 
transmission of “harmful material” to minors, these too were 
eventually defeated by critics on the Supreme Court on First 
Amendment grounds.63 
Outside the realm of pornography, there have also been a variety 
of other efforts to stop the transmission of packets at their source 
since the mid-1990s. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and Security Exchange 
Commission (SEC) have each adopted regulations for their respective 
domains that ban various source transmissions.64 In the realm of 
copyright, Congress passed the No Electronic Theft (NET) Act in 
1997 to address fears of widespread online digital piracy.65 The NET 
Act established criminal penalties for willfully infringing upon 
copyrighted works by distributing them online, regardless of financial 
benefit.66 In 2003, Congress passed the CAN-SPAM Act,67 which 
prohibits a variety of spam transmission practices, such as false or 
deceptive subject lines, using a “dictionary attack”68 to generate an e-
mail address for spam transmissions, or using another computer as a 
spam relay without permission.69 Most of the several dozen spam 
 
 59. For a chronology of Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), which brought this 
challenge, see Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF, ACLU et al. v. Dept. of Justice (ACLU v. 
Reno), http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/EFF_ACLU_v_DoJ/ (last visited May 16, 2006). 
 60. Reno, 521 U.S. 844. 
 61. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
 62. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998). 
 63. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
 64. See Zittrain, supra note 3, at 660. 
 65. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 506, 507 (2000); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319, 2319A, 2320 (1997). 
 66. Id.  
 67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–13 (2003). 
 68. A dictionary attack is a method used both by spammers and by those seeking to break 
encryption schemes by trying every word in the dictionary as a possible password or e-mail 
handle.  See http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/D/dictionary_attack.html (last visited Aug. 16, 
2006). 
 69. Alternative modes of blocking spam, which rely far less on the role of the state but 
rather on the collective action of individuals, are considered alongside the merits and demerits 
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laws around the world ban the sending of unsolicited commercial e-
mail if certain criteria are not met.70 
2. Ban the Possession or Receipt of Packets 
The second form of regulation in the first cluster—banning the 
possession or receipt of certain messages—is the obvious counterpart 
to banning the distribution of certain information in Internet protocol-
based packets. The most notable examples of this sort are combined 
with other regulatory efforts. For example, in addition to the 
provisions regarding dissemination, the CDA also amended the 
federal obscenity laws to prohibit the receipt of obscene materials 
using an “interactive computer service.”71 The CPPA also included a 
ban on the possession of virtual child pornography.72 
3. Place Encumbrances on the Flow of Information in Packets 
The third form of control at the end-points includes mandates that 
messages be accompanied by certain additional information in order 
to be sent or received in packets traveling over the Internet. This 
mode of regulation operates in more subtle fashion than the outright 
ban on dissemination, receipt, or possession of packets. These control 
measures are also generally coupled with other regulatory 
approaches, though not as intimately. Although these laws represent 
an encumbrance on free expression for both the senders and 
recipients, the laws implementing them have focused on senders.  
COPA provisions provided affirmative defenses for restricting 
access to content with age verification technology or a credit card.73 
These provisions met prompt and stiff resistance on First Amendment 
 
of state action. See Johnson, supra note 25. 
 70. See DEREK E. BAMBAUER ET AL., A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SPAM LAWS: THE 
QUEST FOR A MODEL LAW (2005), available at http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/cybersecurity/docs/ 
Background_Paper_Comparative_Analysis_of_Spam_Laws.pdf (discussing the various types 
of spam regulation in place around the world). 
 71. 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (2000). 
 72. Id. § 2252A(a)(2). 
 73. See ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 258–60 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing such 
affirmative defenses as enacted by Congress). 
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grounds.74 The Supreme Court ultimately held them to be 
constitutionally infirm.75 In the related domain of e-mail messages, 
provisions of the CAN-SPAM Act render certain commercial e-mails 
permissible only insofar as they contain an opt-out mechanism, 
whereby a recipient can take herself off the mailing list, notification 
that the e-mail is an advertisement, and a valid postal address for the 
sender.76 
None of the first cluster strategies represent a major departure 
from the end-to-end principle as described by Saltzer, Reed, and 
Clark. That is not to say that these approaches do not burden online 
communication, however; witness the fact that several examples of 
regulation of this sort have been deemed infirm on constitutional 
grounds because of the undue restrictions they would place on users’ 
free expression rights.77 
In a sense, however, the barriers these laws placed on expression 
while they were in force could never, alone, be completely effective 
at achieving their stated public policy goals. Although the potential 
chilling effect in some cases was severe, these forms of legal 
regulation were almost always surmountable by users themselves, 
whether or not the user’s intentions were legally valid. The threat of 
legal enforcement, standing alone, cannot achieve the law’s purpose 
in the online context. Frequently, the users who are carrying out the 
illicit acts will be outside the threat’s jurisdictional reach and can 
ignore the law completely, while others within the jurisdictional 
reach will transmit nonetheless. Millions of Americans have shown 
this to be true in the peer-to-peer context. Spammers, too, have 
flouted the dozens of laws that plainly deem their actions to be 
unlawful. Perhaps the most notable commonality among these 
 
 74. The CDA was challenged soon after its passage.  See Rose Aguilar, Two More 
Challenges to CDA Filed, C|NET NEWS, Apr. 30, 1996, http://news.com.com/2100-1023-
210802.html. 
 75. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 U.S. 2783 (2004). 
 76. 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a) (2000). 
 77. For instance, the Communications Decency Act was struck down in Reno v. ACLU, 
521 U.S. 844 (1997), while the Child Pornography Protection Act was struck down in Ashcroft, 
124 U.S. 2783. 
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regulatory measures is that none has been particularly effective in 
meeting its stated public policy goals.78 
B. The Second Wave of Control 
The second cluster involves state-mandated controls at or closer to 
the middle of the network. The two primary strategies within this 
cluster represent a greater impingement on the end-to-end principle. 
Each is more sophisticated from a regulatory perspective and more 
likely in the near-term to be effective at achieving its stated goals. 
Strikingly, these efforts have enjoyed much greater constitutional 
success and have become increasingly prominent over the last ten 
years.79 In other countries, the trend is even clearer.80 
1. State Encouragement of Private Action to Block Packets 
In the first strategy of this sort, countries prompt private parties to 
block packets as they pass. An early example is section 230 of the 
CDA, which survived constitutional scrutiny and provides immunity 
from civil suit by an end user to a third-party intermediary for “any 
action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the [intermediary] considers to be 
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected.”81 This provision grants nearly carte 
blanche to third-party intermediaries who choose of their own accord 
 
 78. In many cases, the provisions were held to be constitutionally infirm. In other 
instances, where the law remains on the books, the net effect of the legislation has not been to 
solve the problem it was intended to solve. For instance, the CAN-SPAM Act has been widely 
derided as the “You Can Spam Act.” Most reports suggest that the number of spam messages 
sent and received in the United States since enactment of the CAN-SPAM Act has continued to 
rise. Grant Gross, CAN-SPAM Law Seen as Ineffective, COMPUTERWORLD NETWORKING, Dec. 
24, 2004, http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic& 
articleId=98559&pageNumber=1. 
 79. As compared to statutes such as the CDA and the CPPA, the control methods 
described in this cluster have been less frequently challenged and rarely, if ever, declared to be 
constitutionally infirm. 
 80. Consider the frequently updated map of state-mandated Internet control of the sort 
contemplated herein at http://opennet.net/map (last visited Aug. 16, 2006). 
 81. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2000). 
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to block content that a user has made available online, without fear of 
exposure to civil liability relative to that user’s claims.  
Perhaps the most (in)famous example of this strategy—the notice 
and takedown provisions of the DMCA, codified in section 512—
grants another type of immunity for similar activity in the context of 
intellectual property protection.82 Under this provision, a third-party 
intermediary who blocks content after receiving notice from a 
copyright owner gains immunity from a copyright infringement suit 
by the copyright owner so long as it follows a series of statutorily-
defined steps.83  
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
(CALEA),84 part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, offers an 
example by which the U.S. prompts private actors to assist in the 
monitoring of packets, rather than the blocking of them, as they flow 
through the network.85 CALEA dictates that a telecommunications 
carrier has a duty to cooperate in the interception of communications 
for law enforcement purposes.86 In practical terms, businesses, 
universities and others are expected to install equipment in private 
networks that enables law enforcement officers to listen to Internet-
based traffic, much as in the context of a wire-tap in the traditional 
telephone setting.87 
2. Direct State Intervention 
With the second type of control in this cluster, the state becomes 
actively involved in the blocking process, or some governmental 
entity itself blocks access to expression. Twists on this theme have 
involved using various state apparati to effect content blocking. 
Section 512(j) of the DMCA creates a process by which a court, 
under certain circumstances, can order a third-party intermediary to 
block content via an injunction. For example, a court can order a 
service provider to block access to a user’s IP address, or order the 
 
 82. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). 
 83. Id. § 512(c). 
 84. 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000). 
 85. Id. § 1002(a). 
 86. Id. § 1002(a)(3). 
 87. Id. §§ 1001–21. 
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removal of content posted by a user on the service provider’s 
servers.88  
Some state entities that are accessible by private citizens—notably 
libraries—have also decided on their own accord to block access to 
certain content by directly installing filtering software on their 
computers. For example, in 1997, the Board of Trustees of the 
Loudoun County Library in Virginia implemented this strategy as 
part of their sexual harassment policy. The Loudoun policy 
established, among other things, that “all library computers would be 
equipped with site-blocking software to block all sites displaying: (a) 
child pornography and obscene material; and (b) material deemed 
Harmful to Juveniles.”89 The unblocking of sites—an important 
factor, according to at least one Supreme Court Justice90—required a 
written request, review, and approval by library staff.  
The Eastern District of Virginia deemed this direct blocking 
scheme to run afoul of the First Amendment.91 The court first 
characterized library filtering as a “removal” decision based on 
content, rather than an “acquisition” decision, a distinction which, if 
reversed, otherwise might have saved the scheme.92 The court 
determined that the library was a limited public forum, meaning that 
the content-based decision to limit speech was subject to strict 
scrutiny.93 The Loudoun County filtering regime, not surprisingly, 
failed to pass muster under strict scrutiny in federal court.94 
However, attempts to block in such a direct manner have since 
been enacted by Congress and upheld by the Supreme Court. In 2000, 
Congress passed the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA),95 
 
 88. 17 U.S.C. § 512(j). 
 89. Mainstream Loudon v. Bd. of Trustees, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 556 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
 90. Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion of American Library Association, the 
challenge to the constitutionality of the Children’s Internet Protection Act, stated: “If, on the 
request of an adult user, a librarian will unblock filtered material or disable the Internet 
software filter without significant delay, there is little to this case.” United States v. Am. 
Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice 
Kennedy argued that if libraries did not unblock sites as requested by adult patrons, such a 
policy would give rise to a factual, “as-applied” challenge to the law in question. Id.  
 91. Loudon, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552. 
 92. Id. at 561. 
 93. Id. at 563. 
 94. Id. at 570. 
 95. 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/4
p31 Palfrey Rogoyski book pages.DOC  10/31/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006]  The Move to the Middle 51 
 
 
which combines both control strategies of the second cluster. At the 
national level, CIPA prevents public libraries from receiving federal 
funds for patron Internet access unless they install filtering software 
for pornography, obscenity, and other materials harmful to minors.96 
This regulation functions as a prod from one branch of government to 
another to block online expression between the nodes. As of January, 
2005, approximately 59.5% of libraries had complied with CIPA, and 
65% reported filtering at least some terminals.97  
CIPA met with stiff constitutional resistance, but ultimately 
prevailed in the Supreme Court. According to the plurality opinion in 
United States v. American Library Association,98 the federal 
government did not itself filter, but instead only exercised its 
spending power.99 The question considered by the Court was whether 
libraries could filter in this manner in a way that was consonant with 
the First Amendment.100 The Court held, narrowly, that implementing 
filtering software was analogous to a “selection” decision, and that 
full strict scrutiny was therefore not required.101 Five Justices also 
agreed that concerns of over-blocking were dispelled because it was 
easy for library staff to disable the filtering software if needed.102 
Although a library using Loudoun’s original blocking scheme would 
still be problematic, the Court offered clear guidance as to how 
libraries can block expression at a control point in the middle of the 
network in a manner that would pass muster under the First 
Amendment.  
The Pennsylvania state legislature made a similar foray in 2002. 
In this third twist on state-mandated blocking, the Pennsylvania 
legislature granted the state Attorney General authority to obtain an 
order from a local court declaring that “probable cause” existed to 
block access to child pornography, as defined by the statute, 
 
 96. Id.  
 97. See Norman Oder, Budget Report 2005-Tipping Point, LIBRARYJOURNAL.COM, Jan. 
15, 2005, http://www.libraryjournal.com/article/CA491143.html. 
 98. 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
 99. Id. at 203. 
 100. Id. at 202–03. 
 101. Id. at 205–08, 216–17. 
 102. Id. at 208–09, 216–17. These five Justices arrived at the same conclusion as to the 
statute’s constitutionality by various means, with Justice Breyer joining the plurality after 
asserting that heightened scrutiny should be applied to what is ultimately a “selection” matter.  
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accessible through an ISP’s service.103 The Attorney General could 
then direct the local ISP—a private sector third-party intermediary—
to block access to child pornography from the middle of the network, 
subject to a criminal penalty for failing to do so.104 Section 7622 of 
the Pennsylvania Criminal Code specifically provides: 
An Internet service provider shall remove or disable access to 
child pornography items residing on or accessible through its 
service in a manner accessible to persons located within this 
Commonwealth within five business days of when the Internet 
service provider is notified by the Attorney General pursuant 
to section 7628 (relating to notification procedure) that child 
pornography items reside on or are accessible through its 
service.105 
Despite the glaring constitutional issues raised by the 
Pennsylvania statute, a year-and-a-half transpired before a 
constitutional challenge was filed in Pennsylvania district court.106 
By this time, opponents of the blocking statute had amassed evidence 
of over 1.5 million wrongly blocked sites.107 The court reviewing the 
matter found two distinct First Amendment violations, as well as a 
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. The court noted: 
Based on the evidence presented by the parties at trial, the 
Court concludes that, with the current state of technology, the 
Act cannot be implemented without excessive blocking of 
innocent speech in violation of the First Amendment. In 
addition, the procedures provided by the Act are insufficient to 
justify the prior restraint of material protected by the First 
Amendment and, given the current design of the Internet, the 
 
 103. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7621-30 (2002). 
 104. For the most comprehensive review and analysis of the Pennsylvania legislation and 
court struggle, see generally Zittrain, supra note 3. 
 105. 18 PA CONS. STAT. § 7622 (2002). 
 106. For a timeline and extensive review of this matter, see Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., 
Pennsylvania Web Blocking, http://www.cdt.org/speech/pennwebblock/ (last visited May 16, 
2006). 
 107. Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2004).  
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Act is unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause 
because of its effect on interstate commerce.108 
Although there are presently relatively few examples of blocking 
from the middle of the network in the United States, there has been a 
dramatic upswing of such efforts around the world during the last 
five years.109 Most of these efforts are best characterized as Internet 
filtering, carried out either directly by states or via intermediaries, 
such as ISPs licensed by the state to provide Internet access to 
citizens. 
IV. INCREASING CONTROL IN THE NETWORK: INTERNET FILTERING 
AND THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATION 
The bloom is off the rose of the Internet. In the late-1990s, as 
Internet use grew rapidly in the United States and other highly 
developed countries, the mantra that less regulation is necessary to 
protect the growth of the network kept intermediaries from being 
regulated.110 Much of the early legislation regulating Internet usage, 
such as section 230 of the CDA and section 512 of the DMCA, 
expressly exempted ISPs and certain other intermediaries from 
liability.111 The primary argument prevailing in such debates was that 
the economic benefits to be derived from the growth of Internet 
commerce was sufficient to offset any injustice associated with 
preferential treatment of firms doing business or otherwise acting 
online.112 This presumption in favor of a techno-libertarian approach 
to the regulation of Internet-based activity seems to have run its 
course, especially when considered from an international 
perspective.113 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. For a catalog of known, state-based Internet filtering regimes, see http://opennet.net/ 
map (last visited Aug. 16, 2006). 
 110. Tim Clark, Private Sector Should Lead Net, C|NET NEWS, Oct. 28, 1997, 
http://news.com.com/Private+sector+should+lead+Net/2100-1017_3-204745.html (last visited 
Aug. 16, 2006). 
 111. The relevant provisions of the Communications Decency Act are found at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230 (2003). The relevant provisions of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act are found at 17 
U.S.C. § 512 (2003). 
 112. See Clark, supra note 110. 
 113. Not all states fit this trend. Governments sometimes agree with the technologists who 
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Controls at the end-points of the network, whether voluntary or 
mandated by states, have not succeeded in purging the Internet of 
problems.114 Alternative strategies—such as seeking peer production 
of Internet regulation, a more active market, or technical controls—
have yet to work, or, more likely, to be fully pursued.115 The net 
effect is that pressure to allow intermediaries, such as ISPs and e-
commerce companies, to have a free ride in the interest of growing 
the network is no longer such a substantial political impulse, at least 
in the most developed nations. 
The most persistent issues that give rise to regulation at the mid-
points of the network relate to Internet security. The initial concerns 
to which online life gave rise, such as sexually explicit content, spam, 
and illicit trade of intellectual property, persist. New online threats—
with scary names such as phishing, pharming, viruses, and network 
terrorism—have emerged at the front of the list.116 More recently, 
politically subversive speech plays an increasingly important role in 
prompting state-based regulation on the grounds of national 
security.117 
Internet filtering regimes, which block citizen access to certain 
sites on the Internet either directly or through intermediaries, are 
becoming more sophisticated and more commonplace around the 
world as the Internet becomes a greater means of communication, a 
forum for doing business, and a hotbed of political activism.118 We 
are witnessing a cat-and-mouse game being played between states 
 
prefer adherence to end-to-end principles. For instance, the general position of the Polish 
government is that, despite the ongoing problems related to the Internet (such as international 
digital divide, cyber crime, and intellectual property violations), “the unfettered exchange of 
information and free flow of ideas” is important to the development and guarantee of human 
rights. Michal Kleiber, Minister of Scientific Research & Info. Tech., Republic of Pol., 
Statement at the World Summit on the Information Society (Dec. 11, 2003), available at 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/geneva/coverage/statements/poland/pl.doc. 
 114. Spam is the simplest example. Despite dozens of laws at multiple levels of 
government, the spam problems continue to get worse, by nearly all accounts.  
 115. See Johnson, supra note 25.  
 116. Zittrain, supra note 28. 
 117. See, e.g., OPENNET INITIATIVE, THE INTERNET AND ELECTIONS: THE 2006 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN BELARUS (AND ITS IMPLICATIONS) 36 (2006), available at 
http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/belarus/ONI_Belarus_Country_Study.pdf (describing 
the legal, and potentially technical, Internet-related controls established on the grounds of state 
security). 
 118. The OpenNet Initiative, http://www.opennetinitiative.net/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2006). 
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seeking to control the information environment and citizens seeking 
to speak freely online. Filtering technologies, and how they are 
implemented, are becoming more sophisticated with each passing 
year.119 In many places, there is also a corresponding increase in 
terms of the legal mechanisms of control and surveillance.120 
The examples of China and Burma best tell this story of the 
increasing technological and legal sophistication of filtering and 
surveillance regimes. In China, the OpenNet Initiative’s research 
from 2002 through 2005 shows a country that continues to find more 
and more effective ways to control online speech and track the 
movements of its citizens, even as technologies to evade these 
controls become more sophisticated as well.121 Similarly, Burma, 
controlled by its army, appears to have gone from an open source 
technology (DansGuardian) to a proprietary one (Fortinet) in 2005.122 
Most indicators show that Burma’s filtering regime, along with its 
legal regime, are growing more restrictive.123 
A third example is Saudi Arabia, which has had a relatively 
transparent filtering regime for years that is narrowly tailored, mostly 
to pornography.124 However, recent reports note that access to the 
entire set of blogs hosted on Blogger, a popular weblog hosting 
service, has been shut down—a step that plainly leads to over-
inclusive blocking of speech that meets none of the state’s criteria for 
censorship.125 
Uzbekistan is a fourth example, in which the president has 
claimed publicly that the country does not have the resources to filter 
the Internet.126 Nevertheless, the OpenNet Initiative’s research shows 
 
 119. China is the most salient example of this trend.  See OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET 
FILTERING IN CHINA IN 2004–2005: A COUNTRY STUDY (2005), available at http://www.open 
netinitiative.net/china/. 
 120. See id.  
 121. See id. 
 122. See OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN BURMA IN 2005: A COUNTRY 
STUDY (2005), available at http://www.opennetinitiative.net/burma. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN SAUDI ARABIA IN 2004 (2004), 
available at http://www.opennetinitiative.net/saudi/. 
 125. See Posting of Jemima Kiss to http://www.journalism.co.uk/news/story1539.shtml 
(Oct. 5, 2006). 
 126. The OpenNet Initiative has a draft report on Uzbekistan that has yet to be published 
(on file with author). 
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that Uzbekistan is likely the central Asian country with the most 
extensive filtering system, especially of political speech.127 
Burma may be the canary in the mine. Burma demonstrates how a 
developing country that has an overall repressive ideology can extend 
that viewpoint to the information environment as its citizens come 
online. If the Internet in Burma is introduced as a restrictive 
environment in which one’s actions are blocked and tracked by the 
state, the state has a much better chance of keeping a lid—at least for 
a while—on the Internet's democratizing potential. 
Contrast Burma with Saudi Arabia, for instance, in which the state 
did not introduce the Internet until it developed the Internet Services 
Unit. This approach to filtering announced to the Saudi people that 
the state would censor the net, but also take suggestions as to how to 
block and unblock sites.128 Many of the gatekeepers who run 
countries have recently turned away from allowing open 
environments to flourish online.129 Instead, they seek to shape what 
citizens do and say online, in part by literally blocking sites, in part 
by encouraging or requiring intermediaries to block sites, and in part 
by creating a culture of fear through laws and social norms.130 
Perhaps the trickiest ethical problem to emerge from this trend is 
the role of corporations, based in places such as the United States, in 
the filtering and surveillance regimes of other countries. The 
OpenNet Initiative’s research shows that the technology developed 
by at least three United States companies is being used by other 
countries to block Internet access and potentially to listen in on their 
citizens’ Internet activities.131 Setting aside the particulars of which 
company’s technologies are used in which regime, it is plain that this 
creates a lurking “Oppenheimer” problem, in which there is buried a 
 
 127. Id.  
 128. See Internet Services Unit, http://www.isu.net.sa/ (last visited May 16, 2006). 
 129. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 2. 
 130. The series of OpenNet Initiative research reports, see http://opennet.net, collectively 
make this case. 
 131. In most cases, such as in Burma, when researchers contacted the United States-based 
company, they refused to confirm or deny their involvement. The ONI researchers found other 
ways to demonstrate the involvement of these companies, such as finding that the Myanmar 
state has put out a web page talking about it, procuring a “block page” that citizens view when 
they seek to access a forbidden destination on the Internet that has hallmarks of Fortinet’s 
system, and hearing from people on the ground that such a new system is being implemented. 
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complex set of ethical quandaries.132 This problem becomes one step 
further removed when the United States company does not directly 
profit from making the filtering regime itself work. 
In the case of content and service providers, such as Yahoo!, 
Microsoft, and others, who seek to compete in markets such as China, 
the question of whether and how to comply with the foreign state’s 
rules—such as a requirement to turn over personal information of a 
journalist or to remove an allegedly subversive blog—remains vexing 
to the company’s leadership. A third class of equipment companies—
providers such as Cisco and Nortel Networks—are also brought into 
the act when their apparently general-use technologies, such as 
switches and routers, are used for Internet filtering and 
surveillance.133 In the current environment, certain countries rely on 
private actors, often not based in their jurisdiction, to act in a manner 
that is inconsistent with the conception of freedom of expression in 
the private actors’ home markets.134 
United States courts and legislators show very little inclination to 
stand in the way of such a trend, either at home or abroad. Flexible 
filtering regimes, in which intermediaries are required to play a more 
active role in sorting which packets should pass, may well be more 
efficient in the constitutional sense than rules that ban certain 
activities at the nodes. As geo-location and other technical means of 
determining a person’s online identity improves, these techniques by 
intermediaries will only become more effective at achieving their 
public policy goals. This will, in turn, strengthen their constitutional 
position.135 Meanwhile, the end-to-end technological principle 
 
 132. See Derek Bambauer, Cool Tools for Tyrants, LEG. AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2006, 
available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2006/feature_bambauer_ 
janfeb06.msp. 
 133. See id.; see also Nart Villeneuve, Internet Censorship Explorer: Censorship Is in the 
Router, June 3, 2005, http://ice.citizenlab.org/?p=113. 
 134. China, once again, is the most obvious example, insofar as the state’s strategy relies 
heavily upon prompting private actors to carry out censorship and surveillance measures, which 
are well-documented. These measures have given rise to a series of public hearing in Congress 
in 2006 as well as the proposed Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, shares with the authors in 
draft form by the office of Congressman Christopher Smith. An unofficial version of the bill, as 
of February 14, 2006, has been posted to the Internet at http://rconversation.blogs.com/ 
rconversation/files/SMITNJ_094_XML.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2006). 
 135. See Andrew Turner, Geolocation by IP Address, LINUX JOURNAL, Oct. 5, 2004, 
http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/7856. 
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continues to hold no sway in courts’ analyses. Abroad, U.S. 
corporations seeking to compete in markets that filter and tap Internet 
conversations are conscripted without recourse to any appellate body 
or support from their home trade representatives. It may also be that 
the United States itself values the efficacy of turning to corporations 
as partners in the task of regulating activity online.136  
V. DANGERS OF THE MOVE TO THE MIDDLE 
A. Technical Innovation and Competition 
To the extent that the trend in legal Internet regulation has moved 
away from regulation at the edges of the network and toward 
regulation that involves control closer to the center, the grip of the 
end-to-end principle as the dominant design feature of the Internet 
has been loosened, largely through law and policy. The arguments in 
favor of the end-to-end principle are well-developed in the legal and 
technical literature. The primary argument relates to innovation. For 
example, Lawrence Lessig and Mark Lemley argued: 
While the End-to-End design principle was first adopted for 
technical reasons, it has important social and competitive 
features as well. End-to-end expands the competitive horizon, 
by enabling a wider variety of applications to connect and use 
the network. An End-to-End network creates a maximally 
competitive environment for innovation.137 
The basic ideas behind the hypertext mark-up language (HTML) 
and the World Wide Web were proposed on several occasions before 
they became a reality in the end-to-end environment.138 Because of 
the open nature of the architecture, HTML emerged from the Internet 
 
 136. BATTELLE, supra note 36, at 13–14 (discussing the “interesting questions about 
privacy, security, and our relationship to government and corporations”). 
 137. Written Ex Parte of Professor Mark A. Lemley and Professor Lawrence Lessig, In re 
Application for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses MediaOne Group, Inc. to AT&T 
Corp., CS Docket No. 99-251, available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/works/lessig/filing/ 
lem-les.doc.html. 
 138. Markus Fischer, Introduction in HTML 3.2, http://www.itb.uni-stuttgart.de/training/ 
bioinformatics00/Session2.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2006) (discussing the origins of HTML at 
IBM in the 1960s). 
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backdrop and propagated at a wild rate without top-down 
coordination.139 Similarly, the idea behind e-mail existed long before 
it blossomed as a social resource.140 The end-to-end design helped to 
allow participants at the nodes to rapidly set up shop, improve 
existing e-mail applications, and begin sending messages. This 
fostered a network effect that made e-mail communication attractive 
as a general form of communication. More recently, the end-to-end 
design has continued to support the proliferation of an array of new 
technologies, such as peer-to-peer networks (P2P), Internet Relay 
Chat (IRC), and the syndication and aggregation technologies fueling 
Web 2.0.  
B. Democratic Culture 
Innovation has not been limited to technological underpinnings, 
however, as end-to-end design has also fostered cultural innovation 
on a grand scale. Cultural innovation requires much more than the 
development of new modalities of communication, such as wikis and 
VOIP, new cultural icons and fads, or new artistic genres. As Jack 
Balkin argued: 
Democracy is far more than a set of procedures for resolving 
disputes. It is a feature of social life and a form of social 
organization. Democratic ideals require a further commitment 
to democratic forms of social structure and social organization, 
a commitment to social as well as political equality. And the 
forces of democratization operate not only through regular 
elections, but through changes in institutions, practices, 
customs, mannerisms, speech, and dress. A ‘democratic’ 
culture, then, means much more than democracy as a form of 
self-governance. It means democracy as a form of social life in 
which unjust barriers of rank and privilege are dissolved, and 
in which ordinary people gain a greater say over the 
 
 139. See Replication and Caching Position Statement, http://www.w3.org/Propagation/ 
Activity.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2006) (describing, in part, the means of propagation of 
HTML and related technologies in the 1990s). 
 140. A list of early Internet mail systems is included in RFC 808, Summary of Computer 
Mail Services Meeting, http://rfc.sunsite.dk/rfc/rfc808.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2006). 
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institutions and practices that shape them and their futures. 
What makes a culture democratic, then, is not democratic 
governance but democratic participation. A democratic culture 
includes the institutions of representative democracy, but it 
also exists beyond them, and, indeed undergirds them. A 
democratic culture is the culture of a democratized society; a 
democratic culture is a participatory culture.141 
In this passage and elsewhere, Balkin has argued that the purpose 
of free expression is to promote democratic culture, including both 
traditional democratic processes and semiotic democracy—collective 
participation in cultural meaning-making.142 It is important in a 
society that values individual liberty and autonomy to include 
semiotic democracy in the equation for two key reasons. First, culture 
is an important source of identity. Democratic culture gives 
individuals a role in shaping the forces that produce them. Second, 
individual cultural innovators produce their own culture. They 
“exercise and perform their freedom and become the sort of people 
who are free. That freedom is something more than just choosing 
which cultural products to purchase and consume; the freedom to 
create is an active engagement with the world.”143 Balkin further 
argued that developments in digital technologies change democratic 
culture.144 New digital technologies alter the social conditions for 
expression, producing new opportunities for democratic 
participation—both cultural and political expression—and for 
control. 
Reconsider library filtering in the context of Balkin’s view of 
democratic culture. The overblocking or underblocking of sites in a 
given filtering regime is a fact, well-established by the work of the 
OpenNet Initiative and demonstrated in court in a variety of filtering 
cases, among other venues.145 Supporters of CIPA claim that 
 
 141. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 35 (2004). 
 142. Id. at 33–35 n.56; see also BENKLER, supra note 51, at 15. 
 143. Balkin, supra note 141, at 35, 42–43. 
 144. Id. at 42–47. 
 145. See, e.g., Benjamin Edelman, Sites Blocked by Internet Filtering Programs, 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/mul-v-us/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2006).  
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overblocking is a red herring.146 For example, as Justice Kennedy 
opined in American Library Association, if a librarian could quickly 
unblock a site or disable the filtering software upon the request of an 
adult user, “there is little to this case.”147  
This apparently simple technical solution to a thorny social 
problem involves a series of questionable assumptions and ignores 
the cultural context of the use of the Internet in a public space. 
Consider the case most favorable to filtering software given current 
technology—that whenever something is blocked by filtering 
software, it will be flagged as blocked, thereby making the user 
aware of its status. This is not how all filtering software works, but 
all filtering software could likely be modified to function in this 
manner. In some cases, a user that enters a URL for a particular site, 
such as http://usembassy.state.gov (blocked by one software program 
because of the word “ass” embedded in the URL), will know that the 
hosted content is legitimate and should be unblocked.148 However, a 
user who accesses a previously unknown, foreign, or vaguely 
identified site through a hyperlink or search result will not have such 
knowledge.  
Justice Kennedy’s apparently simple solution to the library 
filtering problem assumes too much. It assumes that the user has 
expert knowledge—legal knowledge that it is appropriate or even 
possible for filtering software to be deactivated and technological 
knowledge that filtering software and the libraries that utilize it are 
fallible (i.e., that a site might have been wrongly included in a list of 
blocked sites). Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s solution ignores the role 
of normative pressure on the individual. A library patron who wishes 
to have the blocking technology deactivated must resist the normative 
pressure to comply with the authority that imposes the technology; 
she must also be willing to take the social risk of deactivating 
software intended to block only obscenity. She must gamble that the 
unknown site that she wishes to unblock does not contain harmful 
 
 146. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 209 (2003) (citing the 
Solicitor General’s argument rebutting the critique of CIPA on overblocking grounds). 
 147. Id. at 196. 
 148. See Open Net Initiative Advisory 001, Unintended Risks and Consequences of 
Circumvention Technologies: The IBB’s Anonymizer Service in Iran, http://opennetinitiative. 
net/advisories/001/ (last visited May 16, 2006). 
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content to which she does not want to be exposed, or which would 
embarrass her if displayed at a public terminal.149 
The upshot is that unknown numbers of library Internet users, in 
some cases individuals who do not have sufficient resources to gain 
Internet access in any other way, are denied an equal opportunity to 
participate in democratic culture. This harm flows directly from the 
impingement of the end-to-end principle because third party 
intermediaries place barriers between participants at the nodes. A 
democratic society may decide that this cost is acceptable in light of 
the benefits derived from the blocking regime—in Justice Kennedy’s 
words, “[t]he interest in protecting young library users from material 
inappropriate for minors is legitimate, and even compelling, as all 
Members of the Court appear to agree”150—but the cost should be 
acknowledged and fully calculated into the equation.151 
C. Semiotic Oligarchy? 
The harms that result from impingement of the end-to-end 
principle extend beyond a straightforward reduction of opportunities 
for individuals to participate fully in a democratic culture. Moving 
away from the end-to-end principle also facilitates semiotic 
“oligarchy,” presuming that it is the alternative to semiotic 
democracy. In the copyright context, William W. Fisher III argued 
that because the copyrights that cover a substantial portion of our 
society’s cultural products are in the hands of a relatively modest 
number of large corporations, these corporations are positioned to 
assert control over public participation involving the copyrighted 
material.152 Moving away from the end-to-end principle becomes 
another mechanism by which this transfer of cultural power can take 
place. By moving control of the network from the nodes to the 
conduits, third parties gain the ability to control content at the 
 
 149. By way of rebuttal to this argument, the plurality opinion noted that “the Constitution 
does not guarantee the right to acquire information at a public library without any risk of 
embarrassment.” Am. Library, 539 U.S. at 209. 
 150. Id. at 196. 
 151. Id.  
 152. WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE 
OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004). 
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expense of democratic values. The institutionalization of private 
prejudices about what is permissible for the public to view, in the 
library filtering context, is one subtle example of how moving away 
from the end-to-end principle facilitates semiotic oligarchy.  
The DMCA’s notice and takedown provisions present another 
example. Both the notice and takedown and injunction provisions of 
the DMCA result in situations in which third party intermediaries are 
positioned to block information in the space between users at the 
nodes.153 The former involves a nudge from the state that gets the ball 
rolling; the latter pushes with a court order. In situations involving 
duplicates of copyrighted material, such as mp3-encoded music files, 
the cultural effect of this departure from end-to-end is intentional—
the point is to allow copyright owners to control access to their 
works. However, as with other departures, this purpose brings with it 
unintended consequences. 
First, the corpus of copyright law covering highly transformative 
derivative works, parody, and fair use—cultural innovation instead of 
simple copying—is far from clear to most end users. While arguably 
a good idea as a general policy matter when all factors are weighed, 
this lack of clarity is bad from the perspective of encouraging 
creative re-use of digital materials. Second, media companies hold 
copyrights in a large number of important works that comprise a vast 
swath of the content found online. The owners of these copyrights 
believe that they have a strong economic incentive to protect their 
rights to the full extent allowed by law and, in at least one case, 
beyond.154 As a result, the parties at the other end of the barrel have a 
strong incentive not to fight back. ISPs generally have no business 
interest in a privately created derivative work that would outweigh 
the risk of a lawsuit. Individual creators with a personal stake in their 
works will often lack the resources or savvy necessary to litigate. As 
a result, free expression is chilled and control over democratic culture 
is consolidated far beyond what those who drafted the law may have 
intended. 
 
 153. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2003). 
 154. See, e.g., Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 
2004). 
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D. Many Internets, Less Cross-Cultural Understanding 
A final harm that may result from this departure from the end-to-
end principle is the development of a balkanized, fractured Internet. 
The development of a China Wide Web, a Saudi Wide Web, an 
Uzbek Wide Web, and so forth may protect certain cultural values, 
but stunt the growth of others. The power of the Internet to foster 
cross-cultural understanding at extremely low cost may be sacrificed. 
The collaborative, international establishment of semiotic 
democracy—the promise of which is expressed both via large-scale 
experiments, such as Wikipedia, and small-scale trading of mash-ups 
via e-mail or BitTorrent—is far less likely to come to fruition. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Technological innovation, participatory democracy, cultural 
development, generativity, and other wonderful things could no doubt 
continue to develop without the Internet. These interests can 
plausibly be vindicated in ways other than by upholding the end-to-
end principle of network design. It would be a drastic overstatement 
to contend that any given incremental online legal control means the 
end of free expression on the Internet. A reasonable legislator or 
judge might find in favor of potentially more effective ways of 
solving the problems of online life—whether dealing with sex, 
commerce, culture, or politics—than with the benefits of end-to-end. 
Information technology continues to evolve rapidly and to bring 
with it new and complicated puzzles. The job of the policy-maker, 
who must set rules in a time of such “quicksilver technological 
innovation,” is challenging, if not unenviable.155 In such a fast-
moving environment, adherence to the end-to-end principle is a 
consistently safe bet. However, it is a bet that is not easily draped in 
language that has legal force, other than insofar as end-to-end 
solutions themselves tend to support and foster greater expression 
online. Jonathan Zittrain has forcefully argued that the better 
rhetorical framework may be to emphasize those technical designs—
 
 155. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1174 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
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and corresponding legal, market, and social designs—that favor 
generativity.156  
If history is any guide, the preservation of an end-to-end network 
will mean the promotion of a flourishing democratic culture, 
potentially on a global scale—cultural innovation in an unusually 
rich, empowering sense that should be the goal of the policy-maker 
and technologist alike. The trend away from legal controls consistent 
with the end-to-end principle and toward those that block content 
from the middle of the network works against innovation, the 
development of democratic institutions, and the aspiration of semiotic 
democracy. In a particularly worrisome development, 
intermediaries—such as technology service and content providers—
are increasingly being required to carry out some of the most 
egregious of these proprietary controls as a condition of competing in 
highly attractive emerging markets. 
As the online regulatory environment continues to shift toward 
more control at intermediate points in the network, the job of the 
technologist must be to articulate better the aspects of the threatened 
network designer—whether translated as “net neutrality,” 
“generativity” or other monikers—that must be preserved. The job of 
non-profits and universities, as Charles Nesson argued, is to express 
the power and the possibilities of the network in its least encumbered 
form.157 The job of the legislator, the regulator, and the judge should 
be to listen carefully to the technologists and to determine how to 
preserve those essential elements of the end-to-end principle to 
protect the public interest.  
The most difficult job may ultimately prove to be the challenge 
facing the technology company caught in the cross-hairs of state 
regulation.  Their challenge, if one accepts their likely fate as the 
locus of state regulation, is to shape and adhere to a set of best 
practices for participating in markets in which repressive regimes 
mandate excessive proprietary control at mid-points in the network. 
 
 156. See Zittrain, supra note 28. 
 157. See Charles Nesson, Eon: Law Professor Blogging, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ 
nesson/blog/?p=174 (last visited Aug. 16, 2006). 
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